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At the start of this year we raised the question of whether the global rise of populist 
nationalist sentiment, including the shock of Brexit/Trump to staid liberalisms around the 
world, meant we should think harder about the role of culture in how political and economic 
events unfold (Cooper and McFall 2017). As the year ends, Trump is still President, Marine 
le Pen isn’t, whatever Brexit means remains opaque - and we are witnessing culture (or what, 
at certain moments, to certain ends, gets called ‘culture’) being drawn into a proliferating 
range of brutalities. As we write, the headlines tell us about the thousands drowned in the 
Mediterranean every year amid the ongoing global refugee crisis; the genocidal treatment of 
Muslim Rohingya people in Myanmar; the announcement of an extended and indefinite, 
patently xenophobic United States travel ban, buried within an escalating exchange of nuclear 
taunts between the leaders of the US and North Korea; the entire island of Puerto Rico—an 
unincorporated US territory-, oh let’s just call it what it is, colony—has been left without 
power following Hurricane Maria, while the US President is preoccupied spinning 
professional athletes’ protests of police violence into nativist offense.  
 
If it is true that culture has succumbed to the ‘derivative logic’ of contemporary economies of 
circulation, deprived of essential attributes and working to scramble and undermine the very 
premise of culture as essence, the word nevertheless continues to be used to explain things 
that are politically difficult, intractable, and yes, undeniably brutal. Throughout 2017, alt-
right white supremacists have doubled down on the idea of culture as foundational value, a 
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unique heritage that has the right not only to be displayed, but celebrated and protected—
sheltered. In the US, the rumbling controversy over Trump’s failure to condemn white 
supremacist violence at Charlottesville in August has played out as bizarre semiotic algebra. 
The President’s attribution of responsibility to ‘many sides’ was soon elaborated into a 
Twitter defence of the protests against the removal of a statue of the Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee, on the grounds that the monument recorded an immutable history.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This semiotic equivalencing where statues= history=truth is a form of cultural 
foundationalism that would be as comical as this Twitter correspondent makes it, if only its 
consequences weren’t so real and so bloody. Cultural foundationalism seems to be thriving 
dangerously even amidst an economy of cultural derivatives and a derivative culture.  
 
But perhaps that is to miss the point about the motility of ‘the cultural’. Stuart Hall (1960: 1) 
argued that the experience of culture in all its forms was ‘directly relevant to the imaginative 
resistance of people who have to live within capitalism—the growing points of social 
discontent, the projections of deeply felt needs’. But it wasn’t the pact struck between anti-
capitalist critique and cultural nationalism he had in mind, even if, arriving in Oxford from 
Jamaica in 1951, he well knew the history of such allegiances. Equally, in the UK and EU, 
the determination by left-leaning leavers and progressive populists to find ways of talking 
about ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’ while maintaining a distance from openly regressive positions 
illustrates just how many ends cultural foundationalism can serve.1 If culture has been 
                                                 
1 Of distinctively symptomatic (if not epochal) proportions is the recent confrontation 
between Adam Tooze and Wolfgang Streeck in the pages of the London Review of Books. 
For a presentation and assessment, see Muniesa 2017. 
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deprived of its true essence, faux foundations can easily be claimed. Let’s not forget that 
Alain de Benoist, the intellectual figurehead of the New European (Far) Right, drew perverse 
inspiration from Gramsci’s cultural populism to forge a philosophy of essential civilizational 
difference (GRECE 1981). For de Benoist and his followers, the discredited legacy of 
biological racism could only be redeemed through the recuperation and reinvention of 
Europe’s ‘indigenous’ cultures. But then, what foundations aren’t ‘faux’—or, at least, 
invented: fictions fabricated from historical narrative, political praxis, economic interest, and, 
often enough, concrete? 
 
This is not an enquiry that will be exhausted any time soon. In this, our 10th anniversary year, 
acting partly out of an instinct for psychic self-preservation, we decided to adopt a local and 
playful approach to it by exploring how ideas about culture, identity, and capital are working 
out in a place that happens also to be the original, foundational home of this journal: the post-
war British new town of Milton Keynes.2 
 
On concrete culture 
 
I always thought eternity would look like Milton Keynes.  
                                                 
2 Specifically, this commentary grows out of events held in June 2017, sponsored by the 
Journal of Cultural Economy in partnership with the Open University Citizenship and 
Governance Strategic Research Area and inspired by the 50th anniversary of Milton Keynes. 
The main event MK of the Mind was a midsummery day of presentations, discussions, and 
dérive, convened around Milton Keynes’ central shopping and cultural quarter. The day 
mapped out a broad landscape of cultural engagement between the city, the OU and JCE. It 
would not have been possible without the support of Milton Keynes Council, Milton Keynes 
Gallery, the Open University’s Open Learn team and everybody who contributed to the 
proceedings: Sas Amoah, Allan Cochrane, Agnes Czaika, Joe Deville, Umut Erel, James 
Kneale, Simon Lee, David Moats, Gill Perry, Stephen Potter, Gillian Rose, Eva Sajovic, 
Anthony Spira, Katy Wheeler, and Olly Zanetti.The first circulable incarnation of this 
conversation was as an online essay (McFall and Umney 2017); its next will be as a film by 
London video artist Sapphire Goss.  
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—JG Ballard 
 
There are two things that Milton Keynes is best known for: its roundabouts and its cows. Or 
rather, its Concrete Cows.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Together, these two things have become a cultural shorthand for the new city. The 
roundabouts are a function of UK master planners’ switch away from using lights to manage 
traffic flows at the intersections of the network of grid roads that run between—rather than 
through—residential and commercial districts. To the average observer, the grid appears as 
anonymous tarmac thoroughfares; set into green landscaped corridors that divide and connect 
every corner of the city, the roads have none of the usual urban landmarks people use to 
navigate around an unfamiliar place. In Milton Keynes, as in other examples from Crawley in 
Sussex to Glenrothes in Fife, these corridors have become symbolic of the circuitry of loss 
and loathing that new towns seem to provoke. New towns are derided as settlements without 
history, without community, in some ways lacking the ‘profound emotional legitimacy’ of 
‘nation-ness’ (Anderson 2016: xx). Yet to focus on the roundabouts in terms of the kinds of 
culture they funnel away also misses all the green, the way the ‘lazy grid’, as planner David 
Lock once put it, ‘follow[ed] the flow of land, its valleys, its ebbs and flows’ (in Kitchen & 
Hill 2007).  
 
Sitting alongside the black surface of one of those roads that, we are told, so brutally paved 
over a rural Buckinghamshire paradise, are the black and white Freisian patterns of bovine 
concrete. A small herd of three cows and two calves, created in the late 1970s by the Milton 
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Keynes Development Corporation’s first community artist-in-residence Liz Leyh, for and 
with some of the first, mainly school-age citizens of the town. The cows became the symbol 
for everything that was wrong with Milton Keynes and with the whole idea of building new 
towns in old countries. They were fabricated models of the real thing, half-sized and made 
from scrap, a pale bloodless imitation. Instead of a ‘real’ place with ‘real’ history—one hears 
the echoes of the satirical weight of ‘historicity’ in Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High 
Castle (1962, itself a mid-century product)—Milton Keynes ends up an inferior simulation, 
strangely and inhumanely contoured, lashed together with cheaply reinforced concrete. 
 
The irony of this critique is (at least) twofold. First, the cows were the project of a 
community artist, at some remove from the high altars of studio and gallery. The community 
artist is, at least in principle, a democratised rendering of cultural activity—one that by 
definition requires, well, a community, as well as an artist. Leyh herself has since found that 
her cows’ faces—vandalised and repaired many times, like the concrete facades of much 
mid-century architecture—are not as charming as they once were. Yet irrespective of 
aesthetic judgement, this small herd represents more than just an Aunt Sally for the 
metropolitan literati. As with Wall Street’s Charging Bull and the March 2017 addition of 
Fearless Girl—the former a piece of guerrilla art, now enshrined in popular imaginations and 
elite self-conceptions of high finance; the latter celebrated as a grassroots challenge, yet 
actually commissioned as part of an index fund’s marketing campaign—the politics of intent 
and reception get mixed up over time. Milton Keynes’ Concrete Cows are a legacy of the 
efforts undertaken by the Development Corporation to take the possibility of cultural deficit 
seriously, to build a place that would develop a mind of its own. Community drama, 
community centres, community workshops, and community artists were not an afterthought. 
They were an integral, infrastructural element of the place from the start. The cows are 
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indicative of this infrastructure, they perform it, and in doing so they demonstrate the 
underlying tensions of its creation. 
 
A second irony is that the raw material of the cows, the concrete from which they are formed 
and for which they are named—for all of its connotations of unsympathetic 1960s town 
planning and overbearing architecture—is largely absent from the city itself. ‘Brutalism’, 
with its now-ubiquitous negative implications of the impersonal and the fortress-like, is a 
misplaced and overused term, a stand-in for the late-twentieth-century deterioration of post-
war public promises. And in any case, the architecture of Milton Keynes is less grandiose, 
less bellicose, in its ambitions than the work that inspired Reyner Banham (1966) to 
repurpose the Le Corbusier’s term for unfinished concrete—béton brut—and in the process 
collapse the ethical and aesthetic aspirations of architects and planners, from Le Corbusier to 
Alison and Peter Smithson, who sought to materialize political, even utopian commitments to 
civic transparency, community development, and social inclusion. Banham intended 
‘brutalism’ to convey memorability of image, expression of structure, and honesty to 
materials. But that didn't stop it from becoming code for 1960s ugly or even, by the 1980s 
and 1990s—as water stains spread, rust leached from steel reinforcing bars, and concrete 
crumbled—of the deficiencies of centralized planning or the welfare state more generally. So 
much of brutalism’s poor reputation is, frankly, a symptom of poor maintenance. 
 
The architecture of Milton Keynes is different. The grand projects commissioned in London 
by Sydney Cook, the Chief Architect of the Borough of Camden, were a quick-build, high-
density, low-rise public housing response to post-war necessity. They were designed, just like 
Milton Keynes’ early social housing, by high-flying young architects with big ideas and free 
reins. But while Cook championed the concrete streets of Neave Brown’s Alexandra Road 
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and the art deco complexities of the architectural partnership Benson and Forsyth’s Maiden 
Lane, his Milton Keynes counterpart Derek Walker, worked along different lines. Wayland 
Tunley, Norman Foster, Ralph Erskine, and the ‘Grunt Group’ of Christopher Cross, Jeremy 
Dixon, Michael Gold, and Edward Jones were all ‘starchitects’, and all modernists of one 
variety or another. Yet the local areas they built in and around Milton Keynes—Fullers Slade, 
Beanhill, Eaglestone, and Netherfield—are an eclectic mix of typology, build, and finish.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Milton Keynes’ central shopping centre was described by Sir Nikolaus Pevsner as the best 
looking in the British Isles—high praise in a nation of shopkeepers. It has none of the stark 
lines and finish of its Arndale-era predecessors. Clad in over a half-kilometre of mirrored 
glass, it is bordered to the south by Midsummer Boulevard, a street that follows the summer 
solstice line. Sat at the top of the ridge, around which the grid roads shift and curve, the glass 
and steel shopping centre, opened by Margaret Thatcher in 1979, is a magnet both for high 
street brands and cheaply parked shoppers, whose cars are reflected in the mirrors and whose 
bags egress through the silent yielding of automatic doors. Inside the mall, there is Italian 
travertine marble lit by clerestories. Outside, under the porte-cochères designed to protect 
shoppers from the elements and guide them into the place, camped in the underpasses 
designed to separate pedestrians from drivers, are people busking, begging, eking out. There 
is a kind of brutality in the consumerism displayed here. But there is little concrete. 
 
There is a chronology of cultural epochs here that map loosely onto the historical palimpsest 
of the new city. At its utopian outset, and evidenced through the production of The Plan for 
Milton Keynes (1970), there was the culture of the planner. This mid-1960s-to-early-1960s 
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layer is infused with the post-war consensus of democratic process, equality or at least a 
striving for equilibrium, a faith both in the capabilities of scientific methods to predict how 
and where the place would need to evolve and in the abilities of municipal agents to chart a 
course to get it there. A subsequent stage introduces a culture of pioneers, which collates the 
early settlers, the professionals and academics, the builders and workers, who were employed 
by and in the city and who moved into its early housing schemes, the yellow residential areas 
mapped out in the strategic plan. These pioneers are identified and valorised through the 
imagery of muddy roads, muddy gardens, and a spirit of engaging with and conquering the 
unknown. Such pioneering spirit, like its wild Western colonial predecessors, often overlooks 
and overwhelms that which it encounters on the way, indigenous populations and 
environments alike—and indeed, part of the legacy of modernism, and the modernist city, is 
its persistent disregard for the particularities of place. 
 
As the city became established, reflecting a more developed infrastructure and increased 
private investment, another temporal layer can be seen in the culture of commercial capital. 
The city was always intended to serve as host to capital, and it was actively sold in a global 
marketplace of corporate clients who might be enticed to relocate there, in order to provide 
jobs for the pioneers and subsequent waves of settlers and populate the purple employment 
areas of the strategic plan with iconic buildings and brands. As this commercial imperative 
became better established, more firmly embedded in the material infrastructures of the city, 
there also developed a culture of memorialisation, which, driven by retired pioneers or 
enthused newcomers, seeks to preserve both the essence and legacy of the plan. This 
recognises the unique cultural values that the city’s planners had evoked and seeks to staunch 
the slow dilution of its identity in the face of a perceived deliberate decline of public service 
and public spirit. 
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A final layer, the cultural topsoil of the city, is its emerging culture of culture—out of which 
the decision to bid for the 2023 European Capital of Culture is growing. This process 
catalyses the earlier layers into a cohesive and compelling argument for another wave of 
cultural and capital investment into the city that would acknowledge the uniqueness of the 
city’s past, the challenges of the present, and the potential of its future. 
 
On European Capitals of Culture  
 
Cultural identity […] is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’. It belongs to the 
future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending 
place, time, history, and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have 
histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. 
Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the 
continuous ‘play’ of history, culture, and power. Far from being grounded in mere 
‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will 
secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the 
different ways we are positioned by and position ourselves within, the narratives of the 
past. 
—Stuart Hall (2003: 236) 
 
In 2016, the Destination Milton Keynes tourism body launched a new marketing campaign 
that played on many of the widely held preconceptions of it, branding the city in a show of 
defiance that sought to acknowledge but also subvert the city’s association with bland mid-
century suburban development. ‘Nothing but roundabouts, they said’, reads one poster, the 
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words set against the serene image of bright blue sky, green countryside, and still pond. ‘No 
history, they said’, reads another, promoting Bletchley Park; and on yet another, this one 
featuring the glass façade of the Milton Keynes Theatre: ‘lacking culture, they said’. 
Imploring ‘residents and visitors to show us their #unexpected discoveries in Milton Keynes’, 
the campaign sought to remake the popular imagination of the place, and in this endeavor, 
culture—as the product of history and identity—is put front and center.3 In the challenge of 
identifying the city, of somehow shaping its identity against the paradox of outsider and 
insider views and packaging it in a way that will travel, there is, as Hall writes, a play of 
being and becoming that operates at the level of place, too. An identity politics, but not 
necessarily the kind we’re used to. 
 
At the heart of Milton Keynes’ branding strategy is its bid to be a European Capital of 
Culture (ECoC) in 2023. There is, of course, a major tension at the heart of this approach, a 
contradiction that is glib and obvious, but also accurate in a way that punctures pretensions: 
A ‘pro-Brexit’ city based on the voting patterns in the 2016 referendum on EU membership, 
Milton Keynes has placed a key plank of European cultural policy at the centre of its place-
branding strategy. In the shadow of that contradiction, we might want to raise questions about 
the distance of local policy elites from the voting public. For we know how important cultural 
interests—embedded in particular places with particular people who identify themselves and 
their attitudes and values with their particular histories—are in cleaving leave and remain 
voters (McAndrew 2017).  
 
The pursuit of the ECoC designation in Milton Keynes also tells a story about the 
imagination of the urban—and its distance from the rural—in British public policy. In both 
                                                 
3 See the Destination MK webpage: http://www.destinationmiltonkeynes.co.uk/About-
us/UnexpectedMK.  
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Liverpool and Glasgow, previous holders of the ECoC designation in the UK, the European 
elements were secondary to interventions focused on physical infrastructure or social 
development. This approach is likely to continue as the opportunity to engage in the actual 
cultural tensions of contemporary urban Britain is missed. Instead, there will be a branding 
strategy that is dependent on ignoring the divisions between those consuming and engaging 
in state-supported culture—those who are, broadly speaking, the pro-EU constituency—and 
those who may be least likely to identify ‘culture’ with the formal settings of the gallery or 
the museum, who reject the integrative pan-European project represented by the EU as a 
cosmopolitan or even ‘globalist’ imposition. (The echoes here of race and imperial history 
are not incidental.) In the act of using a cultural festival as brand, the complexity of a city as a 
set of cultural practices, and thus as a rich resource for narrative and design, is flattened in the 
urban policy imagination.  
 
This flattening is perhaps intensified by a ‘culture’ of audit and transparency that has 
gradually, as elsewhere, seeped into the practice of staging cultural events in the twenty-first 
century (Selwood 2006). This approach, with its associated modes of measurement and 
evaluation, is in some ways the ambivalent price exacted by the culture of commercial capital 
in the chase for modernity that seems ever out of reach. Indeed, the audit has become a 
technology of capital, and a target of cultural critique, even as it echoes its past life as an 
ostensibly progressive technology of civic governance. We might even note how the very 
form-follows-function philosophy that turned ‘brutalist’ city halls inside out in order to 
display their social and political purpose on their public-facing surface was itself a 
manifestation of a drive to transparency as a vehicle of participation and pillar of progress. 
The ambivalence of the audit, and of transparency more generally, is dependent on a set of 
research methods that, in themselves, have a ‘social life’ (Campbell et al. 2017). And these 
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histories have shaped the faith shown by policymakers in the transformative power of the 
cultural intervention. It is a faith, in keeping with modern ambivalence, dependent on social 
scientific numbers that are often de- or re-contextualised away from the narrow, and 
technically cautious, settings of their initial conception.  
 
The social life of methods—quantitative, qualitative, and those somewhere in-between—has 
been a core concern of this journal since its founding. Yet methods weigh heavily on culture 
and the ways culture is objectified and made to circulate. Despite continuing attempts to 
square the circle, the specifically cultural effects of self-explicitly ‘cultural’ activity may 
remain resistant to measurement (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016). What can be measured 
becomes valued. But measures and evaluations are often limited in what they can tell us 
about the specifics of place or culture, or they rely on some knowledge of those specifics—
the ‘priors’ of Bayesian probability—before they can work. More to the point, the methods 
themselves tell us something ‘cultural’, even—especially—in what they leave to one side.  
Number of events staged, level of audience attended, amount of pounds spent: these and 
related measures will likely be reported wherever the ECoC ends up being staged. But how 
were the events received? Did people identify with them, and if they did, to what effect? 
Were they the same events that one would have encountered had the ECoC been located in a 
different city? Who was not invited to the party, and who decided on their own not to come? 
 
The ‘flattening out’ of measurement is thus potentially matched by a ‘flattening out’ of 
practice. In a ‘fast policy’ environment (Peck and Theodore 2015, Van Heur 2010), we may 
well find a reliance on tried-and-true models of staging festivities, both literal and more 
metaphorical. Given its concrete cows, it is probably no surprise that Milton Keynes has 
succumbed to the ‘cow parade’ that has become a go-to cultural model for many festival 
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cities around the world, and which has seen an entire menagerie on parade: bears, penguins, 
giraffes, elephants, lambananas, Gromits … The festival city is also likely to see the street 
theatre popularized elsewhere, the spectacle of giant puppets, the celebration of past 
glories—all familiar expectations for planners and attendees alike. These may well provide 
high estimated audience figures, high estimated economic impact, but how does the embrace 
of such forms of measurement—the methods of valuing cultural identity and cultural impact 
themselves—shape active and unfolding forms of belonging, identity, and difference? Where 
does this leave the culture of the city? Is our stock of capital accumulating or diminishing? 
Speaking of the ‘cultural apparatus’ in 1959, the words of C. Wright Mills seem prescient:  
 
You of England, I think, are living off a capital you are not replenishing. The form 
toward which your establishment now drifts may of course be seen in a more 
pronounced, even flamboyant way in the United States of America. (Mills 2008: 212) 
 
Perish the thought. 
 
On capital as culture 
 
Milton Keynes makes visible the way all cities, all places, are the outcomes of cultural 
practice. It was, just like the Open University that is also based there, part of a post-war 
social democratic political settlement. To survive, the town and the university have both had 
to ‘pivot’—to the neoliberal economics of Thatcherism and, more recently, to the new 
fundamentalisms of ‘smart’ governance. Yet the task is not simply to interrogate the culture 
that ‘takes place’ in a city—unfolds through it and becomes rooted in it—but to understand 
the city itself as source material for production, circulation, and consumption of culture, as 
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well as for cultural critique. Milton Keynes is different by design and that history makes it a 
powerful object lesson in the ways capital is always cultural and the ways culture is always 
capitalised. If a city has to become a capital of culture, it is first and foremost with the 
purpose of attracting capital—cultural and otherwise. Finding ways of displaying and 
describing the capacity of being and becoming an asset is the key to the cultures of ‘value 
creation’ and ‘value-added’ that inform these kinds of incentives policies. 
 
And yet, what is capital, anyway (Muniesa et al. 2017)? We might define it as a sum of 
money that can be accounted for from different calculative angles. This would certainly be 
the kind of answer an accountant or an economist might give, and it opens up a variety of 
ways to consider capital—to measure it, to assess it—and the same applies to ‘value’ more 
generally. But we might also take a step to one side to think about capital as a way of seeing 
things: that is, as a semiotic engine, a worldview, a performative prism, and finally—yes—as 
itself culture, even a brutal culture. The doubling of culture and capital, capital and culture, is 
a reminder of how—economically, politically, socially, geographically—cities, centres, and 
capitals come about. Just as we have asked with regards to states (Scott 1998) and markets 
(Fourcade and Healy 2017), we should ask: What does it mean to see like a capital, to see 
like capital? Let’s be brief: To see like (a) capital means, in part, to open up a particular sort 
of future, and a particular sort of value. To see Milton Keynes as capital (of European culture, 
or of future value) means to see, to speculate, in terms of the ‘return’, that which is (re)valued 
through the creation of an expectation of future yield. The return, a financial category par 
excellence, the heart of capital, is also useful as analytical manoeuvre, for it identifies a point 
of intersection between culture as object of value and culture as practice of valuation. What 
kind of ‘return’ is hoped for, aspired to, in the new-old embrace of culture by the Milton 
Keynes city government? The question opens up others. What about the embrace of culture 
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by proponents of Brexit? Or by those seeking to explain the ‘values’ of voters—leavers in the 
UK or Trump supporters in the US—through appeals to region, to class, or to the solidarity 
promised by whiteness? Culture and economy, economy and culture: for readers and 
contributors to JCE, these have always been both object and analytic, and the richness of this 
double life will continue to offer compelling returns. 
 
Future returns 
 
What’s old is new again: new identity politics and new class conflicts, new nationalisms and 
new nativisms, new populisms, new authoritarianisms, new thuggeries—all operating under 
the sign of culture, or said to be one of its avatars. In this context, the Journal of Cultural 
Economy occupies a unique position, with the potential to offer a unique perspective and 
intervention. Since the journal’s founding, we have tracked the many ways all things 
‘economic’ are made and remade. In this inquiry, we’ve learned well the utility of paying 
attention to the contingent connections and disconnections of material and immaterial 
infrastructures, technical and popular discourses, social and political practice. We’ve learned 
how to pay attention to, in short, the concrete. After all, as a composite building material, 
concrete only appears so solid and stone-like retroactively; the fluid slurry must first be 
helped along until it hardens, held in place by wooden frames and reinforced by steel rebar. 
With this history and the way it has shaped the identity of our own community in mind, but 
with the exigencies of the present and future very much unavoidable, we thus return to the 
other half of our name, to interrogate the making and unmaking of culture.  
 
At the end of our first decade, two pillars of the journal’s editorial leadership—Michael 
Pryke and Paul du Gay—are stepping down to join the wider editorial board. Michael and 
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Paul are cornerstones of the cultural economy project. They were both doctoral students at 
the Open University when John Allen, Tony Bennett, Vivienne Brown, John Clarke, Allan 
Cochrane, Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, Graham Thompson, Margie Wetherell—among many 
others—were thinking through the problem posed by culture and its others, especially with 
regard to space, society, identity, gender, cities, the state, organisations, crime, finance … 
Back then, faculty might be locked in a room together for years to come up with answers. 
(We exaggerate but not as much as you might think.) They had to produce answers in a form 
that could be taught at a distance, to students who, for a modest fee, registered on courses 
with no formal entrance requirements. The University of the Air, as it was originally to be 
called, was to offer students who hadn’t had the opportunity to study at a ‘concrete, brick, or 
stone’ university the best that academics of its generation collectively had to think and say. It 
was by playing their parts in this collective experiment that Michael and Paul developed their 
thinking about what a ‘cultural economy’ might be (see, e.g., Allen and Pryke 1994; du Gay 
and Pryke 2002; du Gay 1997; du Gay et al. 1997). It is hard today to imagine all that 
intellectual heft being orchestrated for students first. Thatcultural economy thinking became 
part of a major institutional research programme and a fully autonomous journal—with the 
support of Karel Williams, Michael Savage, and especially, of course, JCE’s founding editor 
Tony Bennett, with the ESRC-funded Centre for Research into Socio-Cultural Change 
(CRESC) behind us—mirrors the chronologies of cultural, social, and economic change we 
set out here.4  
 
Paul du Gay, whose publications going back more than two decades helped carve out the 
field, has been on the Editorial Board throughout the last decade and returned to take on an 
editorial role in 2014. Michael Pryke, meanwhile, worked, alongside Tony Bennett and Liz 
                                                 
4 CRESC had major ESRC funding between 2004-2014. It remains active; see 
https://www.cresc.ac.uk. 
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McFall, as founding editor of JCE beginning in 2006. He became Editor in Chief, overseeing 
production, in 2012, as the journal grew from three then to four and to now six issues per 
year. This happened at a time when universities across the world found themselves locked in 
a paradox of new-found importance and crippling self-doubt, in which so much time is spent 
counting that it’s becoming harder and harder to get anything else done. That we are still 
here, still growing, and now have our own vital audit measure—our first impact factor under 
our belt—is in no small part due to his efforts. Both Paul and Michael will stay on as 
members of the JCE Editorial Board and will remain integral contributors to the future of the 
journal. We list our thanks above—to the many people and institutions, as well the contexts 
that fostered them, who have helped impel this project forward—as an encomium to them 
and their accomplishments.  
 
This bit of history is also a reminder that cultural economy is, and always has been, a 
collective project. It will remain so, for we are also welcoming several new members to the 
editorial team. We are pleased that Fabian Muniesa has jumped wholeheartedly into his new 
role as Chair of the Editorial Board, which also has four new members: Ismail Erturk, Liz 
Moor, Nick Seaver, and Dave O’Brien. Carolyn Hardin is also joining the team as our new 
Reviews and Commentaries Editor, and Lauren Tooker is now one of our Associate Editors.  
Melinda Cooper, Joe Deville, Bill Maurer, and Managing Editor Josh Clark will continue on 
in their current roles as Associate Editors. Finally, we are excited that Taylor Nelms will join 
Liz McFall as Co-Editor in Chief. 
 
As a collective endeavor, JCE has also always been both profoundly interdisciplinary and 
profoundly international, with satellite homes on the West Coast of the United States, in 
continental Europe, and in Australia, as well as in Milton Keynes. With these changes to 
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JCE’s editorial leadership, we are becoming even more so. The production offices of the 
journal are now shared between the Open University in Milton Keynes and the University of 
California, Irvine. We feel this relationship is an apropos one. Irvine is the largest privately 
master-planned community in the United States, and so, like Milton Keynes, it is a product of 
mid-century modern urban planning (Forsyth 2005). Both the town and the university are 
embedded in the contradictory histories of Cold War development, the Southern Californian 
military-industrial complex, and late-twentieth-century real estate financialization. UCI was 
founded in 1964 in the midst of social and political upheaval on a plot of land purchased for 
one dollar from the Irvine Ranch, incorporated as the Irvine Company. The university’s 
founding constituted the first step in the laying out of the new town, and the two shared an 
ambitious master plan by architect William Pereira, who designed, among other famous 
works of mid-century architecture, the original Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the 
Geisel Library at UC San Diego, and San Francisco’s Transamerica Pyramid.  
 
Irvine and Orange County are widely seen as icons of car-centric sprawl, dull 
commercialism, and conservative politics: beige homes interspersed with garish strip malls 
and evangelical megachurches. If Milton Keynes is the butt of jokes about the proliferation of 
Nandos, in Irvine, folks laugh that they can measure distances in Targets. Once marketed as 
“a city for all tomorrow,” Irvine is now, received wisdom has it, the quintessential suburbia, 
and one of the Sunbelt shelters of Reagan Republicanism (McGirr 2015). And also like 
Milton Keynes, concrete plays an outsized role in shaping the popular imagination of the 
place. Unlike Milton Keynes, however, to a certain extent, the perception of Irvine’s concrete 
countenance is an accurate one. The core of UCI’s campus remains marked by Pereira’s 
modernist vision: original buildings in the California brutalist style—elevated platforms, 
bright and sculptural, that appear to float among groves shade trees, with distinctive concrete 
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features that cast dynamic patterns of sun and shadow—spaced around a set of concentric 
rings, at the center of which is a hilly circular park. In photographs of the campus taken by 
Ansel Adams in the mid-1960s, these buildings appear monumental and futuristic, like 
spaceships had landed on the newly cleared ranchland. Yet the design was not purely 
aesthetic; it was intended to serve as the environmental and material support for an 
epistemological project of interdisciplinary knowledge production (UCI was founded without 
departments) and, again like the Open University in Milton Keynes, a political project of 
public education. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
When then-President Lyndon B. Johnson stepped out of a helicopter to dedicate the UCI 
campus in June 1964, he was just over a month removed from his first invocation of the so-
called ‘Great Society’, which sought to set a New Deal-like agenda of public investment in 
infrastructure and education. He was less than a month from signing the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and he was already inextricably implicated in the escalation of ongoing violence in 
Vietnam. Johnson’s dedication of UCI was also less than a decade removed from the passage 
of the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act. Public highway transportation and 
public higher education: two projects of national integration, with ramifying and often 
unintended effects, which stretched the limits of concrete and of the imagination of a 
collective future. 
 
Within a decade or two, the modernist project that shaped Irvine’s founding had begun to be 
associated not with its inclusive, democratic aspirations, but with the disintegration and 
corruption of that dream and its replacement by other “capitalist utopias […], from asset-
based welfare to shareholder capitalism and the ownership society” (Cooper and Konings 
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2016: 3). Brutalism came to feel more dystopian than utopian, a quick cut on prominent 
display in—just for example—the fourth Planet of the Apes movie, in which the concrete 
towers of UC Irvine’s School of Social Sciences featured prominently as the prison of a 
totalitarian state. Perhaps this cultural shift was a predictable one: the progressive projects of 
mid-century Euro-America fell into disrepair and disregard not simply because they fell short 
of their own standards of evaluation, but because—like the project of liberalism generally—
their visions of equality, inclusion, and development were always defined by, and continue to 
be haunted by, their constitutive exclusions. 
 
This is the deeply hopeful and deeply compromised legacy that entangles both Irvine and 
Milton Keynes. It’s there in the architecture itself, and in efforts to trace out the architectures 
and infrastructures of culture and capital. While ‘concrete’, those architectures and 
infrastructures are far from monolithic. Indeed, as Robert J. Kett and Anna Kryzka (2014) 
write of UCI, the institution’s ‘unique situation on the Southern California ‘frontier’ afforded 
exceptional possibilities for academic and institutional experimentation’. Mindful of this 
layered legacy, we remain nonetheless hopeful that the Journal of Cultural Economy can 
build on the public-facing experimental and interdisciplinary histories of its two homes. 
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